

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 PARIS 11907 112059Z  
ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
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INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

S E C R E T PARIS 11907

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: MNUC, TECH, ENRG, FR, PK, (DE GUIRINGAUD)  
SUBJECT: FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE PAKISTAN  
NUCLEAR ISSUE

REF: STATE 091983

1. I RAISED THE PAKISTAN ISSUE WITH GUIRINGAUD ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN REFTEL. GUIRINGAUD NOTED THAT A DECISION HAD NOT BEEN MADE WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE CANCELLATION OF THE FRENCH REPROCESSING CONTRACT. BUT HE DID NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION THAT THINGS WERE MOVING IN THE DIRECTION OF A CANCELLATION.

2. GUIRINGAUD SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED IN SEPTEMBER 1976 THAT THE ORIGINAL PLANT WOULD NOT BE BUILT (AN EARLIER DATE THAN WE HAD HEARD BEFORE AND ON WHICH WE WILL QUESTION JACOMET AT THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY) AND HAD INSTRUCTED FRENCH INDUSTRIALISTS NOT TO MAKE ANY FURTHER MATERIALS OF A SENSITIVE NATURE. HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT, WHATEVER THE FRENCH DO, PAKISTAN WILL BE ABLE TO FIND THE EXPERTISE TO COMPLETE ITS REPROCESSING PLANT, EITHER BY ITSELF OR (HE ADDED, CURIOUSLY) WITH SOVIET  
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HELP. ON THE OTHER HAND, A FRENCH CUTOFF WOULD CAUSE A RUPTURE BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE WEST, BECAUSE ZIA LIKE BHUTTO HAS MADE THIS A SYMBOL OF WESTERN GOOD FAITH.

3. GUIRINGAUD CONFIRMED THAT THE FRENCH ARE STILL CONSIDERING THREE BROAD OPTIONS: (1) CANCELLATION, (2) A "MIXED" PLANT, OR (3) AN EXPANSION OF BILATERAL

COOPERATION IN ORDER TO HAVE SOME FRENCH CONTROL OVER NUCLEAR ACTIVITY IN PAKISTAN (WHICH WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS).

4. GUIRINGAUD DID NOT REACT TO MY DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE WAYS PAKISTAN'S NEEDS COULD BE SERVED BY THE US AND FRANCE IN THE EVENT THE REPROCESSING CONTRACT WOULD NOT GO FORWARD. NOR DID HE RESPOND TO MY DISCUSSION OF THE NEED WE WILL HAVE TO ASSURE CONGRESS ABOUT FRENCH DELIVERIES IF WE ARE TO RESUME AID TO PAKISTAN. HE REJECTED MY ARGUMENT THAT, IF THE FRENCH GO AHEAD WITH PAKISTAN, THE FRG WOULD FIND IT MUCH EASIER TO COMPLETE ITS CONTRACT WITH BRAZIL (I NOTED THAT WE HAD BEEN LEANING HEAVILY ON THE FRG AND BRAZIL); GUIRINGAUD SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE FRG WOULD PROCEED WITH THE BRAZIL DEAL WHATEVER HAPPENED.

5. GUIRINGAUD WAS CERTAINLY NOT TIPPING HIS HAND, BUT, IF HE HAD ANY SIGNALS TO CONVEY (AND I HAVE SOME DOUBTS THAT HE HAD), THEY DID NOT SEEM ENCOURAGING. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 2 OF REFTTEL, I BELIEVE THAT, AFTER THE US-EURATOM RENEGOTIATION ISSUE IS SETTLED, WE SHOULD EXPLORE IN PARIS THE USEFULNESS OF A CARTER-GISCARD LETTER ON PAKISTAN.

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6. I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE ANOTHER QUESTION BEFORE WE GET TOO FAR DOWN THE ROAD ON AID TO PAKISTAN. WHAT WOULD BE THE US POSITION IF FRANCE CANCELLED THE CONTRACT BUT PAKISTAN THEN TRIED TO COMPLETE THE PLANT ON ITS OWN AND COLLATERAL EVIDENCE INDICATED AN EFFORT TO MAKE WEAPONS? IN THE FACE OF THAT, COULD WE THEN CONSIDER MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID TO PAKISTAN? AND IF NOT, SHOULD WE NOW BE BEGINNING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH ON POSSIBLE JOINT AID APPROACHES? HARTMAN

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## Message Attributes

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